The concept of “end of the voyage”

Our partner Omar Córdova and our associate Sabrina Montoya analyze the concept of “end of the voyage” and its relevance in the international maritime transport of goods, examining how this notion serves to determine the completion of the contract of carriage, as well as its impact on the delimitation of the carrier’s liability and on the duration of coverage under cargo insurance policies (ICC A).

The concept of “end of the voyage” is not expressly defined in all international conventions governing the international maritime carriage of goods. Rather, it constitutes a legal and commercial interpretation used within the sphere of trade and international maritime law to determine the point at which the contract of carriage of goods by sea should be deemed concluded or duly performed.

For this purpose, it is essential to examine the content of the applicable international conventions, as well as the relevant national legislation in each jurisdiction, in order to identify the precise moment at which the contract of carriage is considered terminated and, based on this, to assess its impact on the application of the transit clause contained in the ICC A cargo insurance policy.

Now, English legal doctrine has consistently maintained that the contract for the carriage of goods by sea—usually evidenced by a bill of lading or a similar document—comes to an end when “the contractual adventure has come to an end, whether by performance, frustration or lawful termination” [1].

Pursuant to the provisions of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading of 1924 (the Hague Rules 1924) [2], the period of responsibility of the sea carrier is strictly delimited by the “tackle to tackle” principle [3]. According to this principle, the carrier’s responsibility commences at the moment the goods are loaded on board the vessel for carriage and continues until their discharge at the port of destination, with a view to their delivery to the consignee [4]. 

However, it is important to note that this legal fiction underwent a substantial change with the advent of containerization and the privatization of ports. As a consequence of these two developments, loading and unloading operations came to form part of the contract for the carriage of goods by sea [5]. In parallel, the evolution of the Container Yard (CY) clause, as a response to this new economic and operational model of cargo handling, has led to a practical expansion of the scope of the expression “tackle to tackle.”

Indeed, under this modality, the sea carrier’s responsibility with respect to the custody of the goods extends from the moment the cargo is delivered to the area designated by the carrier for its receipt and storage (where applicable) at the port of loading, until its final delivery at the port of discharge, under the same operational logic. Consequently, in certain circumstances, the “tackle to tackle” clause must be understood as applying from the container yard at the port of loading to the container yard at the port of discharge, with the sea carrier thereby assuming responsibility for the cargo throughout that entire period.

However, during the performance of the maritime carriage, situations may arise in which the sea carrier is unable to reach the originally agreed port of destination [6]. In this regard, the concept of “end of the voyage” becomes particularly useful in determining the moment at which the maritime carriage has concluded and, consequently, when the sea carrier’s responsibility for the custody and/or preservation of the cargo ceases.

English case law has made a significant contribution to the understanding of this concept, holding that a voyage may be considered completed when its continuation no longer has a commercially reasonable purpose [7] or when it becomes materially or legally impossible [8] (that is, each situation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to evaluate the available alternatives and the legal consequences arising in each specific instance).

On the other hand, the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978, internationally known as the Hamburg Rules, departs from the traditional “tackle to tackle” concept and establishes, as the regime governing the carrier’s liability for the cargo, that such liability ends when the goods have been delivered at the port of discharge to the consignee indicated in the bill of lading or transport document, in accordance with the circumstances described in Article 4 of said Convention [9].

Thus, in situations involving interruption of the voyage—due to war, port closures, blockades, political risks, or analogous events—the discharge of the goods at a port other than that specified in the bill of lading or contract of carriage does not, in itself, determine the conclusion, termination, or performance of the contract of carriage, insofar as the sea carrier remains responsible for the custody of the cargo until it is delivered in accordance with Article 4 of the Hamburg Rules 1978.

In the field of insurance, this notion may be useful in assessing whether the goods remain reasonably “in transit” and, therefore, whether coverage under the cargo policy (ICC A) remains in force. However, the “end of the voyage” does not automatically equate to the termination of coverage, as this must be evaluated in light of the transit clause and the actual circumstances of the carriage.

Accordingly, the transit clause of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) defines the period of cover by providing that marine insurance attaches from the time the insured goods first move in the warehouse or place of storage specified in the policy, for the purpose of the immediate loading onto the carrying vehicle or other conveyance, with the intention of commencing the insured transit [10].

Coverage continues throughout the ordinary course of transit, including transshipment, intermediate storage, and deviations that are normal or reasonably necessary for the performance of the insured voyage [11]. However, the clause establishes clear limits: the insurance terminates upon final delivery at the agreed destination warehouse or, alternatively, upon the expiry of the maximum time limits—typically 60 days after discharge at the final port for maritime transport—thereby preventing the policy from extending indefinitely to risks unrelated to the carriage as such [12].

In this regard, the discharge of the cargo at an alternative port or the termination of the maritime voyage does not, in itself, automatically bring coverage to an end, provided that the goods remain reasonably in transit [13]. This criterion was confirmed by English case law in The Silver Sky [14], where it was held that transit does not end so long as the goods have not reached their final destination or have not come definitively under the control of the insured. However, this conclusion must also be assessed under the law of the country of the port of discharge or the law to which the parties have submitted, both in the contract of carriage and in the insurance contract.

[1] Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 24ª ed., §§ 20‑021 y ss.

[2] By Supreme Decree No. 006-2021-RE, Peru acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978, internationally known as the Hamburg Rules. This international instrument entered into force on April 1, 2022, and has replaced the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading of 1924, better known as the Hague Rules, which had been in force in Peru since 1964.

[3] Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 402 - The “tackle-to-tackle” principle under the Hague Rules 1924 (Arts. I(e) and II) applies, as a general rule, to the period from the time the goods are loaded on board the vessel until they are discharged, i.e., the so-called “tackle-to-tackle” period.

[4] Carver on Bills of Lading, 5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2020, §§ 9‑001–9‑015.

[5] See Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 512 (CA).

[6] The discharge at an alternative port is reasonable and legally justified (for example, danger to the vessel, port closure, war, or blockade).

[7] This criterion was established by the House of Lords in Rickards v Forestal Land, Timber & Railways Co Ltd [1941] AC 50.

[8] See Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd [1926] AC 497 (House of Lords).

[9] Article 4 of the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978.

“Article 4. Period of Responsibility

1. The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention covers the period during which the goods are in the charge of the carrier at the port of loading, during the carriage, and at the port of discharge.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this article, the goods shall be deemed to be in the charge of the carrier:
(a) From the time the carrier has taken them over from: (i) the shipper or a person acting on his behalf; or (ii) an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to the laws or regulations applicable at the port of loading, the goods must be handed over for shipment;
(b) Until the time the carrier has delivered them: (i) by handing them over to the consignee; or (ii) in cases where the consignee does not receive the goods from the carrier, by placing them at the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the contract, the laws, or the usage of the trade applicable at the port of discharge; or (iii) by handing them over to an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to the laws or regulations applicable at the port of discharge, the goods must be delivered.”

[10] See Clause 8.1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) 2009 and as the carriage has been agreed.

[11] In Mayban General Assurance Bhd v Alstom Power Plants Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1063, the Court of Appeal held that transit continues even where the goods are stored for a significant period at an intermediate destination, provided that such storage is necessary and reasonably connected to the final delivery or installation of the insured goods.

[12] In F.G. Wilson & Co Ltd v British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1921] 2 KB 418, it was held that transit ends when the goods are placed in a warehouse on a final, not merely temporary, basis, even if they are subsequently to be redistributed.

[13] Arnould on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average, 19th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2018, §§ 15‑036–15‑041.

[14] The Silver Sky [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 534.